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INTRODUCTION
The problem of unequal access to educational services in the US has
received the attention of courts and legislators for several decades. A
traditional source of inequality, increasingly addressed by scholars and
law-makers, is the discrimination against students with disabilities, who
t I presented an earlier version of this research at a conference on Rethinking Ideology
& Strategy: Progressive Lawyering, Globalization and Markets, held at Northeastern
University School of Law on November 6-8, 2003.
: Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. Thanks to Jack Beermann,
Dan Danielsen, Gaston de los Reyes, Alan Feld, Duncan Kennedy, John Koss, Silvio Micali,
Fran Miller, Martha McCluskey, Fernanda Nicola, Maureen O'Rourke, Mark Pettit, Steve
Rickard, Kerry Rittich, Sarah Robinson, and Kate Silbaugh for their comments at different
stages of this project. I have also benefited from the insights of many wonderful education
experts with whom I have had the privilege of working as a special needs mother. Errors are
mine.
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were once deprived tout court of real educational opportunities.' In this
field, legislative intervention has been momentous and political forces
across ideological lines have converged to provide children with disabili-
ties proper access to public learning. The reform of special education
has achieved tangible results in the last thirty years and has provided
children with unprecedented opportunities.
Educational inequality, however, shares the nested structure of Rus-
sian dolls and lurks at each new layer. Several scholars have pointed out
that focusing on children's disabilities may result in decreased attention
to students in social or economic trouble. 2 This essay focuses on another
under-explored distributive dimension of special education law that is
internal to the pool of children with identified disabilities and detectable
in the workings of each educational agency. As illustrated in the pages
that follow, special education services are currently allocated on the basis
of heavy parental participation in the administrative process. Bargaining
power and negotiation strategies play a significant role in the ultimate
determination of children's entitlements. These mechanisms are worthy
of praise in many respects and should be retained. Thanks to such partici-
pation opportunities, families devoid of financial means but endowed
with advocacy skills may still ensure that their children receive an ade-
quate education. 3 Parental involvement also allows for truly individual-
ized educational plans, drafted with full knowledge of each child's
strengths and needs. Recent attempts to limit parents' say in the process
of defining appropriate educational services are not commendable.4 It is
nonetheless important to point out that such bargaining mechanisms
combine with other traits of the system-such as wide agency discretion,
lack of transparency, and budget constraints-to generate unintended
outcomes. It was explicit in the design of the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act that the distribution of special education services
would counteract existing inequalities.5 However, there is evidence that
the resultant distribution is uneven. 6 The current system yields lower
I See, e.g., Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (striking down state statutes which barred or
delayed the entry of mentally handicapped students into public schools).
2 See generally MARK KELMAN & GILLIAN LESTER, JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY
INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES (1997).
3 See infra Section V.A.
4 See, e.g., PROPOSED MASS. REGS CODE tit. 603, § 28.07 (December 21, 2004), availa-
ble at http://www.doe.mass.edulawsregs/proposed/p603cmr28.doc. These proposed amend-
ments follow the recent enactment of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement
Act (2004), which will take effect on July tst, 2005.
5 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (2004) (effective July 1, 2005).
6 See, e.g., SPECIAL EDUCATION EXPENDITURE PRojECT, How DOES SPENDING ON SPE-
CIAL EDUCATION STUDENTS VARY ACROSS DISTRICTS? 7-8 (2003) (if classified by median
family income, special education expenditures per student are significantly lower in the low-
est-income group), available at http://csef.air.orglpublications/seep/national/AdvRpt2.PDF.
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payoffs for needier families, which are on average less endowed with
bargaining power and therefore less capable of taking advantage of par-
ticipation opportunities. 7
What follows is not an overall critique of special education law. 8 If
compared with prior regimes, the current system has certainly succeeded
at improving the average condition of children with disabilities.9 The
purpose of this article is to examine the law's distributive effects in order
to devise strategies of correction while upholding the federal govern-
ment's commitment to the educational welfare of children with
disabilities.
Sections I-IV examine the structure and consequences of bargaining
for entitlements envisaged by current special education laws. Section V
draws insights from the literature on the distributive effects of compul-
sory contract terms and other mandates. Section VI links the contractual
features of the system to a second potential source of uneven distribu-
tion-unguided administrative discretion. Section VII explores certain
theoretical dimensions of parental participation in the allocation of spe-
cial education services. This interesting but flawed model of par-
ticipatory democracy illustrates with unusual clarity the potential
shortcomings of collaborative governance and sheds light on the distribu-
tive implications of deliberative democracy theories. Section VIII dem-
onstrates how the specific budget constraints of special education
combine with contractual mechanisms and agency discretion to produce
undesirable distributive effects. Section IX recommends that distributive
considerations be given visibility and substantive weight in the imple-
mentation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.
I. SPECIAL EDUCATION AND CONTRACTS
Up until the 1970s, it was common to exclude many children with
disabilities from public schools.' 0 The long-term achievements of these
individuals depended solely on their families' ability to help them finan-
cially and emotionally." As a reaction to this practice, in 1975 the US
Congress passed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of
7 See id. at 8-10.
8 For a comprehensive criticism of legal backfire claims aimed at repealing or blocking
progressive legislation because it allegedly hurts the groups it means to help, see generally
Robert Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C.L. REV. 819 (2002).
9 See KELLMAN AND LESTER, supra note 3, at 2.
to See generally Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children, supra note 2.
11 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2)(D) (effective July 1, 2005) ("Before the date of enactment of
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Public Law 94-142) [enacted Nov.
29, 1975], the educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were not being fully
met because... a lack of adequate resources within the public school system forced families to
find services outside the public school system.").
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1975.12 This Act (amended and renamed the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act or IDEA' 3) mandates that all children with disabilities
receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE) in the least restrictive
environment (LRE),' 4 integrating the children as far as possible into
mainstream classrooms and keeping them up to speed with the regular
curriculum.' 5 The Act also ensures procedural due process rights for
parents and establishes a particular mode of cooperation between fami-
lies of children with disabilities and school districts: the individualized
educational program (IEP).16
Today, parents of children with special needs quickly become famil-
iar with the IEP acronym. Before the beginning of each school year,
parents must approve and sign a rather lengthy document drafted by the
relevant school district which specifies what kind of services and accom-
modations each eligible child will need in order to receive a "free and
appropriate public education" according to the law.1 7
It is difficult for most parents to understand what an IEP really is.18
Informational brochures attempt to clarify that parents can have a say in
the production of the document, and that they can reject it if they do not
agree with it.19 At first sight, the process seems to follow the familiar
pattern of administrative allocation of entitlements. The working as-
sumption in such processes is that the values of public welfare, as op-
posed to private autonomy, will control the ultimate decisions of public
officials and of reviewing agencies or courts. 20 However, parents of
children with disabilities are repeat players. Sooner or later they learn
that traits of contractual autonomy may characterize the IEP process.
They learn that their consent to a proposed set of educational services is
essential to the school, and that they can withhold it if not satisfied with
the proposal. 2 1 The affirming language of rights informs the rhetoric of
12 Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (codified as 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976)).
13 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat.
1103 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (effective July 1, 2005)).
14 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1) (effective July 1, 2005).
15 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5) (effective July 1, 2005).
16 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d) (effective July 1, 2005).
17 Id.
18 See id.
19 See generally THE MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC. PARENT'S RIGHTs BROCHURE (Jan. 2002),
available at http://www.doe.mass.edulsped/prb/prights.pdf.
20 See KELLMAN & LESTER, supra note 3, at 196-197 (describing the tendency to attempt
to distribute resources to the learning disabled as a group).
21 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (effective July, 1 2005) ("Any State educational agency, State
agency, or local educational agency that receives assistance under this part [20 USCS §§ 1411
et seq.] shall establish and maintain procedures in accordance with this section to ensure that
children with disabilities and their parents are guaranteed procedural safeguards with respect to
the provision of a free appropriate public education by such agencies.").
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special-education advocates. Parents learn that someone, somewhere,
has engaged the school district in intense negotiations and obtained either
much better services within the same district or free placement of their
child in sophisticated, expensive private schools capable of addressing
that child's special needs. 22 Parents also learn that special education is a
matter of federal rights, 23 and that the IEP process is a just battle worth
fighting until the very end for the sake of a deserving child-their own.
Along with other sources, some states reinforce the rights discourse
with contractual jargon. The Massachusetts Department of Education, for
instance, explains that "[t]he IEP is a contract between you and the
school. As with any contract, you should make sure you fully understand
the terms to which you are agreeing and make certain that everything that
was agreed to verbally is written in the contract."
'24
This language is often echoed in communications, both formal and
informal, between families and special education professionals.2 5 The
use of contractual jargon makes and is designed to make a powerful im-
pression upon both parents and school district personnel. 26 There are no
contracts in matters of welfare benefits.2 7 By contrast, IEPs are referred
to as contracts and therefore, parents are led to believe, must be differ-
22 See, e.g., DANIEL McGROARTY, PROGRESSIVE POLICY INSTITUTE, THE LITTLE KNOWN
CASE OF AMERICA'S SCHOOL CHOICE PROGRAM 290 (2001).
23 See generally Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-
476, 104 Stat. 1103 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1487 (effective July 1, 2005)).
24 FED'N FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS & THE MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC., A PAR-
ENT'S GUIDE TO SPECIAL EDUCATION, at http://www.fcsn.org/parentguide/pgtext.txt (last vis-
ited Nov. 4, 2004). The IEP is also referred to as a contract in THE MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC.,
IEP PROCESS GUIDE 15 (June 2001), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/sped/iep/
proguide.pdf: "The IEP is a contract between the school district and the parent. The IEP
should reflect the decisions made at the Team meeting and should serve as a contract between
the school system and parent(s). For that reason, the document must clearly communicate to
parents the needs of their child, the steps the school district will take to address these needs
and the progress their child is expected to make during the set IEP period. The IEP must also
be written in generally understandable language and free of educational jargon. The IEP does
not serve as a guarantee of progress. However, school districts must be aware that IDEA-97
clearly states that a school district must make a good faith effort to assist the student in making
progress towards the IEP goals."
25 See, e.g., SALLY OZONOFF, GERALDINE DAWSON & JAMES MCPARTLAND, A PARENTS'
GUIDE TO ASPERGER SYNDROME & HIGH-FUNCTIONING AUnsM, 165 (2002) ("The IEP is best
thought of as a contract between parents and schools that outlines what the team agrees is an
appropriate education for the child.")\.
26 See FED'N FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS & THE MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC, supra
note 25 ("As with any contract you should make sure you fully understand the terms to which
you are agreeing and make certain that everything that was agreed to verbally is written in the
contract.").
27 See Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal
Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1245-46 (1964-65) (describing the common theory that welfare is
a gratuity from the state, subject to whatever conditions the state chooses to apply).
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ent.28 Administrators also share the sense that a contract is a higher,
more immediate and accountable form of commitment toward children
with disabilities than their generic duty to implement state and federal
laws.
2 9
Contradicting these guidelines, the federal IDEA does not contain
any reference to contracts. 30 The Massachusetts Department of Educa-
tion's lexical choice, as it turns out, is technically inaccurate. An IEP is
not a contract in a formal sense. It is simply a statement produced by an
educational agency at the end of a formalized collaborative process, de-
fining the appropriate set of special education services for a given
child.3 ' Services are technically not a matter of contractual rights, but
are educational entitlements conferred by law to each eligible child on
the basis of stated criteria and with due process guarantees. 32 The IDEA
contains elements of a pseudo-contractual nature, such as parents' partic-
ipation in the IEP drafting process 33 and parental consent as a condition
precedent to the implementation of any IEP provisions. 34 But such fea-
tures are increasingly common in the relationship between citizens and
administrative agencies and are signs of collaborative governance rather
than traits of contractual dealings in a technical sense. 35 Special educa-
tion lawyers, when faced with questions on the legal nature of IEPs, usu-
ally downplay the contract analogy and explain to parents that an IEP is
not as forceful as a contract when it comes to judicial enforcement. 36
28 See FED'N FOR CHILDREN WITH SPECIAL NEEDS & THE MASS. DEP'T OF EDUC, supra
note 25, at 15.
29 Id. at 15 (describing the vital role educators play in devising an IEP and modifying
the curriculum so that the student succeeds in the special education program).
30 As defined by Congress, an individualized education program is simply "a written
statement for each child with a disability [that includes] a statement of the special education
and related services... that will be provided .... 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(iv) (2005).
31 Id.
32 See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414-1415 (effective July 1, 2005).
33 20 USC § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (effective July 1, 2005).
34 20 USC § 1414(a)(1)(D)(ii)(II) (effective July 1, 2005) (guaranteeing parental consent
before the provision of services).
35 See generally Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State,
45 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1997) (discussing collaborative governance and why current collabora-
tive models fall short of the collaborative ideal). See also Negotiated Rulemaking Act, 5
U.S.C.S. § 571 (2004).
36 The following quotes are indicative of this attitude:
"[The IEP is not] a contract that a parent could sue a teacher under, in a contract case, because
the teacher did not produce the outcomes expected on the IEP. But the school has to carry out
what is on the IEP." Reed Martin, J.D. At our IEP meeting, the school personnel told me "The
IEP was not a contract," Special Education Law & Advocacy Strategies, at http://
www.reedmartin.com/iepmorethancontract.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
"Is the IEP a contract? No, not in the true sense of contract law. The IEP is a document
written by specified school personnel together with the parents. The IEP does obligate the
school district to provide the services identified in the IEP." Nessa G. Siegel Co., LPA, Fre-
quently Asked Questions, at http://www.nessasiegel.com/faql.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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The main difference lies in the fact that, in case of disputes over the
correct implementation of the IEP, the stipulated clauses are not inter-
preted by courts as contracts would be, but rather are read with substan-
tial deference to agency discretion.37
The fact remains, however, that IEPs are as close to contracts as it
gets in the realm of public services governed by federal law. The IEP
drafting process includes strong elements of bargaining and is open to
the influence of market forces, just as private party contractual dealings
usually are.38 Because resources are limited, families end up competing
for special education services, just as different groups may compete for
affirmative-action entitlements. 39 IEPs are the product of veritable nego-
tiations between a child's family and the educational team.40 According
to the IDEA, the team is composed of teachers and specialists-usually
employed by the relevant school district, but occasionally hired as ad-hoc
consultants. 4' After an indefinite number of optional informal contacts,
parents and team sit together to define an IEP draft. The contract meta-
phor is most forceful at this stage. The two parties, while apparently
pursuing the common target of an appropriate education for the child,
work on the basis of conflicting subtexts. Even if school personnel are
truly committed to the well-being and educational progress of the
child-an often true assumption among dedicated administrators-the
school district must work within budgetary and political constraints,
while parents tend to equate "appropriate education" as mandated by law
to "absolutely the best education" for their children.42 Parents' ability to
take part in an agency's decision-making process at its very beginning
gives them much more leverage than they might have in traditional ad-
ministrative procedures. The outcome of this negotiation, as typical in
the contractual context, is the product of such variables as the parties'
advocacy power and access to experts.43
Contractual analogies of this intensity are rather unique in adminis-
trative law. Private contracts have long inhabited the universe of service
37 See infra Section VI.
38 See generally Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454 (1908-09).
39 See Deborah Ramirez, Multicultural Employment: It's Not Just Black and White Any-
more; 47 STAN. L. REV. 957, 969-74 (1995).
40 See U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3) (detailing the factors that the IEP team should consider) (ef-
fective July 1, 2005).
41 See U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(IV) (effective July 1, 2005).
42 The difference (and frequent confusion) between the two standards is highlighted by
OZONOFF ET AL., supra note 25, at 166: "Know your legal rights. For example, you do not
need to sign the 1EP until you agree that it provides what the law promises you .... Equally
important, however, is understanding that the law says your child is entitled to an appropriate
education, not the best education. Just as with regular education, parents may choose to
"purchase" what they perceive to be the best education for their child through a private
school."
43 See SPECIAL EDUCATION EXPENDITURE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 10.
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provisions, but such contracts are usually stipulated by public agencies
on one hand, and service providers on the other. 44 In the IEP process, by
contrast, the educational agency negotiates directly with service recipi-
ents. 45 Contractual mechanisms also pervade the field of rule-making
and standard-setting, where some federal agencies such as the Environ-
mental Protection Agency seek the preliminary consensus of stakehold-
ers rather than relying on the traditional practice of notice and
comment.46 Rulemaking, however, has built-in characteristics of trans-
parency and publicity that are simply inconceivable in the context of pri-
vate and confidential IEP negotiations. The investigation of contractual
hybrids, increasingly popular in current administrative law literature, 47
has not yet entered the field of special education, where collaborative
governance takes on particularly conspicuous contractual features.
II. CONTRACTUAL MECHANISMS AND
DISTRIBUTIVE CONSEQUENCES
Interestingly, IEPs' similarity to contracts tends to increase in direct
proportion to families' advocacy power and access to resources. Con-
sider the following illustration:
Family A and Family B have children with identical dis-
abilities, but different bargaining power. In fact, A and
B could be snapshots of the same family taken at differ-
ent points in time, far apart in the steep learning curve
prompted by the realization of their child's disability.
In Family A the parents have no bargaining power, because they are
either not educated, or because they are too emotionally or financially
drained to conduct any meaningful negotiation. Their child has just been
identified as eligible for special education services. This family will sign
an IEP, as proposed by the school district, without questions or demands.
For this family, the IEP is not a contract, but merely a statement of what
the educational agency feels legally obliged to do for their child. Because
the school district is acting on the basis of a federal mandate, the legal
duty rule nullifies any pretense of consideration on the school's part.48
The parents are consenting recipients of federally mandated services, and
44 See Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished De-
mocracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-To-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1559, 1556 (2001).
45 See 20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(1)(B) (explaining who is present in an IEP meeting) (effective
July 1, 2005).
46 See David Dana, Innovations in Environmental Policy: The New "Contractarian"
Paradigm in Environmental Regulation, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 35, 45 (2000).
47 See generally id.; see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and
the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. Rav. 342 (2004).
48 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 CMT. C, ILLUS. 1 (1979).
2005] BARGAINING & DISTRIBUTION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 179
their contribution to the district through taxes hardly qualifies as consid-
eration. If anything, being a tax-paying resident is a condition for the
school's performance, but again, the contract analogy here is poor. With
no pressure from the family, the definition of entitlements is likely to be
determined not only by the relevant administrators' understanding of the
FAPE standard, but also by budget and resource considerations. The dis-
trict will therefore offer the family a set of educational services that can
be provided with little financial strain. The resulting IEP will be enforce-
able, but the school system runs no real risk of ever breaching its clauses
and facing "contractual" liability.49
By contrast, Family B is endowed with financial and educational
resources. The parents have firm opinions about what qualifies as "ap-
propriate" education for their child, and have no intention to settle for
anything less than the best educational setting available, whether that be
in the public education system or in a private school. They are equipped
with legal counsel, specialists' reports, and private evaluations of their
children, all recommending a complex and expensive set of services. For
Family B, the contract analogy is most appropriate. Their IEP is indeed
a bilateral exchange of promises. After several meetings and rounds of
discussion, the school district offers Family B more educational benefits
than the family would have received without "fighting," which is, by
Family A's standards, more than the law requires. 50 What is not caught
by the existing legal duty rule is fresh and valid consideration. Moreo-
ver, this IEP is likely to be better written, to contain more clearly mea-
surable goals, and to be more easily enforceable against non-compliant
districts.5'
What does the family offer in exchange? As is common in settle-
ment agreements, Family B promises not to sue for the next 12 months
insofar as the district complies with its IEP obligations. This promise is
of real value to the school district-in fact, it has been the parents' im-
plicit and credible threat of litigation that has led the school district to
49 See Nessa Siegel, supra note 36.
50 This follows from the assumption that the services received by Family A already meet
the legal standard of FAPE. On the many possible meanings of FAPE, see generally Tara L.
Eyer, Greater Expectations: How the 1997 IDEA Amendments Raise the Basic Floor of Op-
portunity for Children with Disabilities, 103 DICK. L. REv. 613 (1999) (provides overview of
judicial interpretation of FAPE and evaluates the post-amendment procedural requirements
relating to each child's special education program); Charlene K. Quade, A Crystal Clear Idea:
The Court Confounds the Clarity of Rowley and Contorts Congressional Intent, 23 HAMLINE J.
PUB. L. & POL'Y 37 (2001) (examines and critiques the judicial decisions challenging FAPE in
the Eighth Circuit).
51 Poorly written IEPs are notoriously plagued by indefiniteness problems. See, e.g.,
Jared L. Graves, Meeting The Texas Education Agency's Demands for Special Education Stu-
dents: Is Your Texas School District Performing Adequate ARDs? 5 TEX. TECH J. TEX. ADMIN.
L. 153, at 167 (2004) (explaining that IEPs often contain vague statements, instead of focusing
on concrete measurable objectives).
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give in to some of the family's perhaps eccentric requests. The DOE's
use of contractual terms may not be technically precise and yet it cap-
tures, at least in part, the reality of bargaining for special education.
III. PARTICIPATION PROMISES
In at least two ways, the idea of empowering parents in the design
of an individualized educational plan for their children is appealing from
a distributive viewpoint. First, it guarantees formal equality of opportu-
nities to all families. Second, it allows individual involvement to gener-
ate positive externalities for all. Let us examine in turn these two
promises of the IDEA, and then explain why they are both so difficult to
keep.
A. EQUAL ACCESS TO NEGOTIATION OPPORTUNITIES
If school districts' decisions in matters of services and placement
could be challenged only ex post, by means of costly hearings or judicial
proceedings, families with scarce financial resources would simply have
no chance of participation. By contrast, parental involvement in IEP
drafting is in principle status-blind. There is sufficient anecdotal evi-
dence of families devoid of financial means, but armed with a profound
understanding of their children's needs, with a serious commitment to
their education, and with much determination. 52 Their norm-centered
advocacy is independent of social status or wealth. 53 Their children may
gain full access to IDEA opportunities and obtain no less from an educa-
tional agency than children from wealthier families. Since the IDEA en-
sures that all families will be involved in the definition of an
individualized program and formally guarantees equal opportunities to
all children with disabilities, its results are certainly preferable to the pre-
IDEA regime.
The problem, however, is that the injection of negotiation elements
into the picture raises the specter of substantive bargaining inequality and
sweeps away the prospects of truly equal opportunities for all children
with disabilities. Negotiations take place in the shadow of a very uncer-
tain law. The legal standard of FAPE is unavoidably vague, and it is
impossible to know ex ante to what services any given child will be
deemed entitled if the dispute is litigated.54 Since the law is phrased in
52 See generally Mothers From Hell 2 (advocates of disability rights), at http://
www.mothersfromhell2.org (last visited Nov. 4, 2004); see also Susan Sheehan, The Autism
Fight, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2003, at 76.
53 See Mothers From Hell 2, supra note 53 (describing themselves as "fighting chipped
tooth and broken press-on nail for the appropriate education, community acceptance, desper-
ately needed services, rights of and entitlements for individuals with disabilities").
54 See Charlene K. Quade, supra note 50, at 49-55.
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terms of highly flexible standards, strategic bargaining is encouraged
rather than discouraged,5 5 and families will have incentives to engage not
only in norm-centered argumentations (invoking rules, citing precedents,
and producing reasoned elaborations) but also in strategic behavior in-
volving "the exercise of power, horse trading, threat, and bluff." 56 This
is where having power and plenty of horses to trade makes all the differ-
ence, because the threat of litigation is more credible when it comes from
well-off families. Therefore, the chance for such families to win a better
bargain is much higher.
Another reason why equal access to the IEP process is an empty
shell is the fact that the neediest families may intentionally renounce the
very opportunity of negotiating and even resist the identification of their
child's disabilities. 57 Often, self-exclusion begins at the early stages of
identification.5 8 Accepting the fact that one's child is unquestionably
disabled is not easy. The stigma that accompanies a disability diagnosis
causes some parents to keep their children out of the pool of special
education recipients. 59 This happened regularly in the past, when chil-
dren with special needs were systematically labeled as mentally re-
tarded-a label that is intuitively unappealing. 60
Today, by contrast, the IDEA fosters the laudable philosophy of in-
clusion and builds upon the values of learning diversity. As a result of
growing public awareness, improved disability culture, and embellished
jargon, there is increasingly less emotional resistance to special educa-
tion labels. 6 1 Paradoxically, it is in this laudable form of cultural evolu-
tion that one finds the first kernel of inequality in the practice of special
education. Disability is more likely to remain a stigma in less well-off
neighborhoods, which are more remote from professional support and
less well-served with informational services. 6 2 When information is in-
adequate, families may have a tendency to reject the suggestion that their
child might need an evaluation and eventually an IEP.63 A family's like-
55 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 969 (1979), for a clear illustration of this phenomenon
in the context of divorce settlements.
56 Id. at 973 (quoting Melvin Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute
Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638 (1976)).
57 See KELLMAN AND LESTER, supra note 3, at 86.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 To this day, the Massachusetts Department of Mental Retardation (DMR) provides
handicapped residents with grants and other services on the basis of very little screening;
however, the ugliness of the DMR acronym is a very effective gate-keeper. See STEPHEN R.
SCHROEDER ET. AL., RESOURCE NETWORK INT'L, USAGE OF THE TERM "MENTAL RETARDA-
TION:" LANGUAGE, IMAGE, AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 16 (2002).
61 Id. at 92.
62 See KELLMAN AND LESTER supra note 2, at 86.
63 Id.
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lihood of applying for IDEA services is often proportional to their access
to professional networks. For example, recent immigrants in urban areas
are likely to be hostile to the idea of special education, which they often
deem stigmatizing and potentially discriminatory. 64 The equalizing effect
of opportunities stemming from parental involvement may therefore be
completely nullified in practice.
B. POSITIVE EXTERNALITIES
Other equalizing forces are also at work in the IDEA design. When
families with strong bargaining power manage to negotiate a very high
standard of FAPE for themselves, less well-off children may ultimately
benefit from such efforts. Conscientious administrators will not allow
for great discrepancy between forcefully negotiated educational plans
and the service regimes designed in the absence of parental advocacy.
As a result, outspoken parents may serve the interests of all children in
the school district and, by informational spillover, of the nation. In this
light, the distribution of resources among children with disabilities may
not be a zero-sum game. It may also be the case that the injection of
further special education resources into a classroom benefits typical stu-
dents as well. The advocacy work of some parents may pay dividends
for everyone; it raises the standards of appropriate special education and
augments the rights of all children. The injection of contractual mecha-
nisms in the allocation of entitlements may enhance the know-how and
quality of all services, serving the interests of all children with disabili-
ties in line with the normative spirit of the IDEA. The outcome may not
be absolutely fair, but it may at least be Pareto-optimal.
However, the problem with such uplifting prospects is that the sup-
ply of special education services is not sufficiently elastic. The hard ne-
gotiating work of Family B is likely not to generate any positive
externalities for Family A whenever the educational agency has less than
infinite human and financial resources. 65 Administrators operate under
serious financial constraints, and not every family will be allowed to win
generous applications of the flexible FAPE standard. Therefore it is in-
evitable that resources will be diverted away from children of less force-
ful parents. 66 This mostly unintended diversion is at least in part a by-
product of the IEP's contractual features. Once again, the empowerment
of families in the process, while laying the basis for a laudable form of
participatory democracy, reveals much inequitable potential.
64 Id.
65 See discussion on funding infra Section V11I.
66 See KELLMAN AND LESTER supra note 2, at 89 ("[T]he most aggressive par-
ents.. frequently were able to have their children tested immediately, both by making personal
contacts with relevant administrators and by being aware of their legal rights to diagnosis.").
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IV. PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT AND LIMITED
SCHOOL CHOICE
The current economic understanding of general education markets is
based on the assumption that public schools can coexist and compete
with private schools in terms of both quality and quantity of educational
services. 67 In this context, the most obvious form of parental involve-
ment is the choice of an appropriate school for their children; a choice on
which the current presidential administration places enormous empha-
sis.68 By voting with their feet, parents express their judgment on the
relative worth of public versus private schools and on the relative value
of different public school options. Parents tend to have strong opinions
about both these issues.69
In the context of special education, parents' involvement takes on a
different meaning altogether. Public schools offer something that most
private special-education schools do not: the pedagogical model of inclu-
sion (part-time or full-time), which allows students with disabilities to be
surrounded by typically developing peers. 70 In fact, inclusion is man-
dated by law whenever possible. 71 This inclusion model is most appeal-
ing to parents of children with relatively minor disabilities who are more
likely to be mainstreamed into regular education programs. 72 Private
schools, on the other hand, may offer a high degree of specialization for
certain disabilities, and when they do, they are intuitively not appealing
to the families of typically developing children. Inclusion models exist
but are infrequent in the private sector.73 It is only by ignoring this ma-
jor point that researchers may see the privatization of special education
as the cure for parents' dissatisfaction. 74
Parents who would have otherwise chosen a private school which
offered the model of inclusion are often stuck in a public school setting
and can only voice their hopes and discontent within the IEP team.75
67 See DANIEL McGROARTY, supra note 22, at 292.
68 Bush Calls Ruling About Vouchers a Historic Move, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002 at Al.
69 See DANIEL MCGROARTY, supra note 22, at 294-95.
70 See KELLMAN AND LESTER supra note 2, at 94-102.
71 See 34 C.F.R. § 300.550(b)(1) (2004) (requiring that to the maximum extent appropri-
ate, children with disabilities must be educated with children who are not disabled).
72 See Therese Craparo, Remembering the "Individuals" of the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act, 6 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 467, at 496-500 (2003) (describing
several instances of parents' battle for inclusion against school district recommendations).
73 See OZONOFF ET AL., supra note 26, at 169 (explaining that private schools are not
obliged to accommodate children with special needs so that they can be included in regular
programs).
74 See Jay P. Greene & Greg Forster, A New Model for Special Ed: Voucher Plan Could
Ease Mass. Woes, BOSTON HERALD, June 15, 2003, at A48 (describing Florida's school choice
programs as a response to this dilemma).
75 Id.
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Collaboration with an agency becomes the only outlet for manifesting
their views and preferences in matters of educational strategies. The
package that the agency provides may be the only one containing the
desirable feature of inclusion, and will therefore be accepted, even
though it may lack many valuable accessories that the parents would
have willingly paid for if inclusion were available in private schools.
IEP negotiations are the tools by which parents put pressure upon
the education provider to add such accessories to the package. It is to be
expected that the force of such negotiations, measured in terms of law-
yers' or specialists' fees, will be directly proportional to each family's
willingness and financial ability to privately purchase the package of
their choice. Such factors should have no impact on the ultimate quality
of an IEP; however, they are certainly not irrelevant in practice, as dis-
cussed above.
V. CONTRACT LAW AND DISTRIBUTIVE ANALYSIS
Given that the regressive distribution of educational resources is, to
a considerable extent, a by-product of the system's reliance on contrac-
tual mechanisms, it is worthwhile to look for analogous distributive phe-
nomena in the proper realm of contract law. This search yields some
false positives, but also some interesting insights.
Contractual discrimination paradigms find no immediate parallel in
the IEP context. 76 In the car sales example famously analyzed by Ian
Ayres, the negotiation strategies pursued by all buyers were identical,
and the fact that certain categories of buyers were systematically penal-
ized had an obvious flavor of discrimination. 77 Here, the reality of dif-
ferentiated deals can be readily explained without suspecting any
discriminatory animus in agency conduct. First, there are obvious differ-
ences between the active negotiation strategy of Family B and the pas-
sive role of Family A. Second, the agency may know enough about the
families' status to take Family B's threat of litigation more seriously than
Family A's and be subliminally affected by such knowledge. The word
"discrimination" can be used in this context as well, 78 but in a much
76 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (2000) (guaranteeing the same right to contract and buy
property to every citizen). As there is no intentional racial discrimination in the IEP system, or
a denial of the fight to participate in the contractual process, there would be no violation of the
civil rights law.
77 See Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotia-
tions, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819-20 (1991).
78 The following passage illustrates in broad terms this kind of "rational" discrimination,
identified by Ayres (/d. at 842-3) as profit-maximizing strategy rather than social bias:
"[C]ontracting involves discrimination .... [W]here I choose to contract with a particular
party, I may set different terms of trade than I would if I were entering into a similar transac-
tion with somebody else-for example, because the party with whom I am contracting
presents more risks to me or imposes a greater cost on me than alternative contracting parties."
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looser sense. Contractual discrimination due to lack of money, initiative,
or simply grit, is notoriously non-actionable. 7
9
The concept of regressive distribution, borrowed from fiscal jargon
and used throughout this article, seems descriptively more appropriate.
In so far as entitlements are withheld from needier families and corre-
spondingly allocated to those that are better-off, distribution of public
resources is indeed regressive. But what if regressive distribution is the
unintended by-product of legislative intervention, specifically designed
to correct economic inequalities, or at least to operate above market
forces? The literature exploring the distributive consequences of com-
pulsory contract terms has much to say on this point.
Beginning in 1971 with the work of Bruce Ackerman on housing
codes, the analysis of compulsory contract terms has focused on the dis-
parate impact of mandatory product warranties on different types of buy-
ers, and has highlighted patterns of redistribution from marginal to infra-
marginal consumers. 80 Reduced to its bare bones, the core intuition of
that literature is as follows: whenever there are marginal consumers
ready to give up a product altogether if its price rises significantly, the
price of that product will not be seriously affected by the imposition of
mandatory warranties. 8' Sellers will hesitate to pass the whole cost of
the warranty onto the consumers for fear of losing the marginal ones,
82
and thus may only raise the price of their product by a small amount.8
3
Marginal consumers who place zero value on the warranty will continue
to buy the product because the price increase is modest and no immediate
substitutes are available.84 They will thus pay more than they did before,
in exchange for something of no value to them.85 By contrast, infra-
marginal consumers who place a high value on the warranty will obtain it
at a relatively low cost. 86 Marginal consumers, often the worst-off to
begin with, will subsidize infra-marginal ones. 87 The pro-consumer
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 188 (Harvard University
Press 1993).
79 See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA.
L. REV. 1277, 1306 (1993) ("[The US Supreme] Court periodically warns that any judicial
intrusion into allocative decisions, expressive as they are of majoritarian preference, would
harm the foundations of democracy itself.").
80 See generally Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the
Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J.
1093 (1971).
81 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribu-
tion in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 374 (1991).
82 Id. at 384-85.
83 Id. at 385.
84 Id. at 385.
85 Id.
86 See Bruce Ackennan, supra note 80, at 1105.
87 See Richard Craswell, supra note 81, at 373.
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logic of the mandatory term caii still be satisfied in so far as buyers as a
whole obtain a distributive advantage over sellers.88 However, within
the pool of consumers, redistribution may run against the progressive
logic of the mandate and yield, in fact, a regressive result. 89
This analysis applies, with due adjustments, to the context of special
education. The participation rights conferred upon parents in the formu-
lation of IEPs bear strong analogies with mandatory contract terms.90
The pool of service recipients is a highly heterogeneous group of con-
sumers, only some of whom are capable of exploiting the IEP process to
the fullest. As discussed above, Family B gains much from its bargain-
ing opportunity exactly because Family A derives zero value from it.
While children with disabilities are better off as a group, regressive sub-
sidization occurs between the two sub-groups of benefit recipients.
This kind of subsidization begs for correction when it is the unin-
tended by-product of progressive mandates. The regressive distribution
allowed for by the IEP process is, indeed, incompatible with the spirit of
the IDEA. Children's disabilities manifest themselves across the social
spectrum. Sometimes they strike like lightning in an otherwise perfectly
blue sky. Some other times they land on a pile of emotional and eco-
nomic misery. The IDEA does not aim at corrective justice on this front,
but neither should it allow for less aid in the latter case than in the
former.
The point is not to jettison the very idea of compulsory contract
terms or federal mandates, but rather to study the conditions which allow
for certain redistributive aberrations. 9' For our purposes, this prompts
the investigation of other traits of the system. As we shall see, the use of
pseudo-contractual mechanisms in the determination of entitlements
might not lead per se to the described undesirable results. The problem
is that, in the field of special education, private bargaining combines with
endemically unaccountable administrative standards and funding con-
straints. It is this "perfect storm" 92 that ends up penalizing the neediest
families.
88 See Bruce Ackerman, supra note 80, at 1105.
89 Id.
90 For a forceful parallel between compulsory contract terms and the judicial definition
of due-process rights in matters of welfare entitlements, see Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms
and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MARYLAND L. RaV. 563, 595 n.12 (1982) (discussing
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)).
91 See generally Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223
(2000).
92 SEBASTIAN JUNGER, THE PERFECT STORM: A TRUE STORY OF MEN AGAINST THE SEA.
A "perfect storm" is a combination of meteorological conditions creating a high-powered
weather system. Here, socioeconomic and government factors combine with the bargaining
elements of the IEP process to generate inequitable distribution of educational services.
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VI. ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEMS
Since family involvement in the IEP process is useful and even nec-
essary in so many ways, it would be desirable to capitalize on its values
while deterring all potential distortions by means of appropriate mecha-
nisms of accountability. On this front too, however, the system is less
than perfect, because the IEP process is inherently opaque and special
education is refractory to objective measurement. Let us examine, in
turn, these two issues.
A. TRANSPARENCY VERSUS PRIVACY
Wherever models of collaborative governance are successfully ap-
plied, the regulatory outcome of business-agency negotiations is always
made known, either to the public at large or to a considerable number of
stakeholders.93 The possibility for cross-references and comparisons is
built into the regulatory processes.
Things are different, however, in the case of IEPs. Families are
entitled to absolute confidentiality, and the outcome of their negotiations
with the competent regulatory agencies is kept secret.94 In any given
classroom, only the school personnel are entitled to full disclosure of the
special needs of all their students. 95 Parents are not allowed to make
comparisons between IEPs, since comparison would involve disclosure
of other families' issues, and disclosure is against the law. For privacy
reasons, parents have no way to know which services other families are
receiving and, therefore, no way to identify distributive inequalities.
Correction is the exclusive prerogative of agencies, and, therefore, it is
impossible to remedy cases of agency failure or capture.
B. FLEXIBLE STANDARDS AND THE PARADOX OF DISCRETION
Even if comparisons were allowed, there would be no tertium com-
parationis. Because children are unique, and the standards of appropriate
education are intrinsically ad hoc, there are no shared features or com-
mon platforms of reference on the basis of which a comparison between
two IEPs could be made. 96 Flexibility is a blessing of the system and a
tribute to the sophistication of its designers, but it is also a curse when it
comes to monitoring. A major break-through brought about by the IDEA
was the legislative acknowledgement that disabilities come in a wide va-
riety with varying degrees of intensity, and that no child is like any other.
The IEP process was expressly designed to produce a unique assessment
93 See David Dana, supra note 46, at 37.
94 See generally Peter A. Walker & Sara Jane Steinberg, Confidentiality of Educational
Records: Serious Risks for Parents and School Districts, 26 J.L. & EDUC. 11 (1997).
95 34 C.F.R. § 300, 560-76 (2003).
96 See Therese Craparo, supra note 72, at 522.
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of each child's special needs, with agency discretion and parental in-
volvement intended to allow for truly customized services. The draw-
back is that, in this context, because all children are different, unequal
treatment is, by definition, justified.
Even if aware of actual discrimination, parents bear daunting bur-
dens of proof. When Family A is denied services that Family B is instead
enjoying, it is presumed by law that this choice depends exclusively on
objective differences between the needs and learning aptitudes of their
children. 97 Family A has no way to rebut that presumption by means of
factual comparisons and must fight its battle focusing exclusively on
what is "appropriate" for their child. The catch is that appropriateness is
once more a matter of agency discretion. The standard of judicial review
is by no means intrusive, at least when the agency has determined that, in
one way or another, a child's educational needs can be accommodated in
a particular educational setting.98
The Federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 makes standardized
testing (with minimal adaptations) mandatory for most children on
IEPs. 99 Tests might work as objective measures of performance and as
benchmarks of accountability, and unusually poor scores in given dis-
tricts could indeed signal an aggregate deficit of appropriate special edu-
cation. However, no single family would benefit from such information.
Individual test failure may be due to many other factors besides inade-
quate service delivery.' 00 Conversely, relatively good scores do not
demonstrate that a relatively successful child has been given the chance
to actualize her full potential. Families may have been treated more or
less equally in any given district, but they just have no way to know it,
either ex ante or ex post.
97 See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 192 (1982).
98 The Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1416(e)(8) (effective July 1, 2005),
provides for a "substantial evidence" standard, which the Supreme Court has interpreted in a
rather deferential fashion. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207 (1981) ("[Clourts must be careful to
avoid imposing their view of preferable educational methods upon the States."). For a discus-
sion of the problematic scrutiny of unequal treatment in areas of high agency discretion, see
RONALD A. CASS, COLIN S. DIVER & JACK M. BEERMAN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 736-7 (4th ed. 2002). Judicial review is much stricter when parents appeal the
agency's choice of a separate placement; the mandate of inclusion in the "least restrictive
environment" is very forceful and deviations are often scrutinized de novo. See Daniel H.
Melvin 11, The Desegregation of Children with Disabilities, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 599, 658-9
(1995).
99 See No Child Left Behind Act, 20 U.S.C. § 631 l(b)(3) (2001) (requiring that the states
test all students' performance). See, e.g., Massachusetts Department of Education, Require-
ments for the Participation of Students with Disabilities in MCAS, (2004) at http://
www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/alt/spedreq.pdf.
100 See Cory L. Shindel, One Standard Fits All? Defining Achievement Standards for
Students with Cognitive Disabilities Within the No Child Left Behind Act's Standardized
Framework, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 1025 (2004).
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VII. LIMITS OF COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
In spite of its pseudo-contractual features, the IEP process remains a
matter of administrative entitlements implemented by governmental
agencies. Its distinguishing trait is the unusually intense participation of
service recipients in the process of service design and delivery. In many
ways, this trait characterizes various forms of agency work that are com-
monly identified as instances of collaborative governance.' 0 '
Legal scholars have recently taken much interest in collaborative
governance, based on the involvement of all interested parties in the
work of administrative agencies, as a plausible cure for many regulatory
inefficiencies. 0 2 This lawyerly insight goes hand-in-hand with the de-
velopment by contemporary political theorists of the model of delibera-
tive democracy, which adopts extensive grass-roots participation in
decision-making as a formula for optimizing the substance and legiti-
macy of regulatory outcomes. 10 3 Examples of the convergence between
deliberative democracy theories and faith in collaborative governance ex-
ist in the field of education law. Scholars have celebrated the current
U.S. educational system, with its emphasis on parental choice, decentral-
ized teaching practices, and multiplicity of models, as an excellent labo-
ratory for polyarchic experimentation. 104 The concept of accountability
through testing, recently espoused by the No Child Left Behind Act, has
also been hailed as the gateway to the development of best practices by
way of data exchange and methodological comparisons. 0 5 Within this
logic, the IEP drafting process, involving families as active participants
with significant due process rights, might seem on its face to be the sub-
stantiation of deliberative democracy ideals. At least with respect to the
field of special education, the crusade during the 1990s for parental in-
volvement has been thoroughly successful.' 0 6 The IDEA allows parents
to be a major force in the design of individualized programs for their
children. Outcomes are therefore custom-tailored (with no redundant
services) and aimed at addressing the specific needs of each child.
The problem with this picture, however, is its tendency to "see a
world in a grain of sand and heaven in a wild flower."' 0 7 The foregoing
101 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543 (2000).
102 Id. at 547.
103 See generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., 1996).
104 See James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey Barely
Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003).
105 Id. at 283.
106 Mary Sue Johns, The New Crusade: Parent Involvement, 94 SCH. ARTS 16 (1994).
107 Mark Tushnet, A New Constitutionalism for Liberals? 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE, 357, 358 (2003). Tushnet borrows this poetic metaphor from William Blake to de-
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pages have told a cautionary tale of participatory democracy. The field
of special education can be mired by instances of both agency capture
and agency failure in the gathering and processing of parental input. Pre-
liminary evidence depicts a landscape of disturbing inequalities, which
are systemically hard to pin-point and resistant to correction. 0 8
The promising traits of participation can be easily offset in the real-
ity of special education. Formal access to negotiation opportunities may
become an empty shell, and positive externalities may prove simply im-
possible to attain given the low elasticity of supply of educational ser-
vices for children with disabilities.' 0 9 Accountability is endemically
scarce, and therefore it is virtually impossible to detect and cure the
many instances of substantive inequalities, leading the neediest families
to get the least amount of educational benefits from the system. 110 The
elaboration of best practices by way of comparison-a crucial element of
polyarchic democracy-is rendered impossible by the natural opacity of
the system. Rather than being a triumph of collaborative governance, the
IEP process provides a useful check-list of drawbacks, doomed to defy
the rosy predictions of collaborative governance scholars.
VIII. FLEXIBLE FUNDING AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS
The broad issue of inequality across states or districts in the funding
of public education is beyond the scope of this essay."I I With the spe-
cific goal of shedding light on the inequalities that may occur within each
district, one must rather focus on the budgetary constraints faced by any
given educational agency in the determination of special education
entitlements.
The IDEA provides for federal funding of special education. The
amount of federal grants is, in principle, directly correlated to the number
and the seriousness of identified disabilities in each state or district, and
should therefore increase proportionally when more children necessitate
the provision of expensive services. 1 2 In practice, much of the funding
scribe the overly enthusiastic endorsement of the No Child Left Behind Act by Liebman &
Sabel, supra note 104.
108 See supra notes 6 and 7.
109 See supra, Sections II-III.
1 10 See supra, note 6.
11 1 The U.S. Supreme Court famously decided not to intervene in matters of school fi-
nance. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). Since then,
State courts and legislators have struggled to strike the proper balance between equity con-
cers on one hand and the politics of tax-based local control on the other.
112 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411(a)(2) (effective July 1. 2005). The maximum federal grant
amount is obtained by multiplying the number of eligible children by 40% of the average cost
of per student expenditure in public schools. In reality, this maximum funding limit is never
reached. The proposed 2006 budget, while cutting Department of Education spending by 1%,
requests 4.8% more money for special education. Proposed Budget of the United States Gov-
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of special education is local, and bears on the limited finances of school
districts.' 13 Local educational agencies are obliged to serve all special
education children as identified along IDEA guidelines, and to fund all
the services recommended by their IEPs in order to meet the FAPE stan-
dard. 1 4 The problem is that, in spite of the intended flexibility of this
design, the supply of special education resources is relatively inelastic. ' 5
Because funding is limited, zero-sum dynamics in the distribution of fi-
nite resources are unavoidable.
In the specific context of special education, the lack of funding elas-
ticity is aggravated by a number of circumstances. Like that of most
government programs, IDEA funding is under strenuous competitive
pressure in political arenas at the local, state, and Federal level. Special
education is a resource in insufficient supply and high demand. The IEP
family receives something others will not. Their child gets truly individu-
alized attention in a public school, at no cost. Neighbors, same-state tax
payers, and, to a lesser extent, the nation at large, subsidize that child's
education. Not everyone can aspire to an IEP.' 1 6 The law makes it clear
that social, racial or educational disadvantages are not disabilities for IEP
purposes. 1 7 Children whose impaired performance at school is mostly
due to "social maladjustment," poor knowledge of the English language
ernment: FY 2006, available at http://a255.g.akamaitech.net/7/255/2422/07feb20O51 4 15/
www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/pdf/budget/energy.pdf (last updated February 11, 2005).
However, even with this increase, special education would still be funded at roughly half of
the authorized 40% level. President Bush's Proposed FY 2006 Federal Budget for Education,
National School Board Association, available at http://www.nsba.org/site/print.asp?
TRACKID=&VID=2&ACTION=PRINT&CID=892&DID=35292 (last accessed Feb. 15,
2005).
113 Only part of the costs of special education mandates come from federal grants. On
federal and state funding of local educational agencies for the implementation of special edu-
cation mandates, see Assistance to States for the Education of Children with Disabilities, Sub-
part G-Allocation of Funds; Reports, 34 C.F.R. § 300 (2004).
114 In reaction to the chronic failure of the IDEA funding provisions and to state and local
struggles to keep up with rising special education costs, the House Committee on Education
and the Workforce considered a proposal "to amend the Individuals with Disabilities Educa-
tion Act to provide full funding for assistance for education of all children with disabilities"
("Full Funding for IDEA Now," H.R. 823 (2003)). Another version of this bill was proposed
as an amendment to the IDEA reauthorization bill (H.R. 1350 (2003)). This amendment would
massively increase special education funding to the 40% level promised 30 years ago at first
passage of the IDEA. However, the amendment was eventually voted down by a narrow
margin.
115 See also Gregory F. Corbett, Special Education, Equal Protection and Education Fi-
nance: Does the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Violate a General Education Stu-
dent's Fundamental Right to Education? 40 B.C. L. REV. 633, 646-47 (1999).
116 In order to be on an 1EP, a student must have one among a close list of possible
diagnoses. Each state drafts its own list of requirements. The requirements are more stringent
than those triggering Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended. 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (2000).
117 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30)(C) (effective July 1, 2005).
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or lack of discipline are expressly left out. 1 8 In 1997, Mark Kelman and
Gillian Lester pointed out that this trait of the system leads to regressive
distribution of educational resources, penalizing low-income families. 119
According to their analysis, individuals with non-diagnosable socio-eco-
nomic disadvantages systematically subsidize special education recipi-
ents in ways not always warranted by reasons of substantive justice.
Kelman and Lester abstained from prescriptive conclusions. In reaction
to their findings, however, other legal scholars have opposed the heavy
funding of special education as unwarranted by policy reasons 20 or as
plainly discriminatory.' 2'
In this scenario, it is obvious that funding cannot be proportional to
the actual number of entitled recipients and to the cost of all necessary
services, but will ultimately reflect the inelastic value placed on hope,
learning diversity, and inclusion by the relevant constituency. 22 At any
point in time and at any level of governance, a relatively fixed portion of
public funds will be set aside for the education of children with disabili-
ties. The funding of special education can expand or contract depending
on political will, but from the viewpoint of an agency engaged in the
definition of specific entitlements in a specific school year, funding is
never unlimited.
Additional constraints arise from the lack of precise economic justi-
fications for special education expenditures. Disabilities are particularly
costly matters.' 23 The IDEA obliges schools to engage in the expensive
business of educating atypically developing children. Analogously, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) expects employers to allow
adults with disabilities into their workforce even if this involves provid-
ing for expensive accommodations.124 However, one difference particu-
larly defies the usefulness of such analogies and begs the development of
118 See, e.g., 603 CMR 28.00: SPECIAL EDUCATION, at 603 CMR 28.02 (f) (2005).
119 See KELMAN & LESTER, supra note 2, at 197.
120 See Tamara J. Weinstein, Note: Equal Education Opportunities for Learning Deficient
Students, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 500 (2000) (proposing that diagnostic criteria be extended to
encompass all sorts of "learning deficiencies," including those due to students' socio-economic
disadvantages). Weinstein's proposal is appealing as fundamentally egalitarian, but if not
backed up by ad hoc funding, it does imply a significant dilution of resources and arguably
defies the very meaning of special education.
121 See generally Gregory F. Corbett, supra note 115.
122 The IDEA's goal to render children with disabilities "prepared to lead productive and
independent adult lives, to the maximum extent possible" is clearly inspirational. 20 U.S.C.
§ 1400 (c)(5)(A)(ii) (effective July 1, 2005).
123 The per-pupil cost of special education is notoriously much higher than that of general
education. One calculation puts the expenditure per special education student at $12,480 per
year, while the per pupil cost of a regular education student is $6,573. See SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION EXPENDITURE PROJECT, supra note 6, at 16.
124 The distributive consequences of ADA mandates have now become the subject of
insightful research. See generally Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 91.
2005] BARGAINING & DISTRIBUTION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION 193
ad hoc distributive inquiries in the IDEA context. ADA mandates per-
tain to individuals with disabilities who have already come of age and
whose value to the workforce is readily ascertainable. 125 Costs can be
and are often justified by careful cost/benefit analyses, comparing the
financial burden of providing accommodations with the advantage of re-
absorbing adults into the workforce. It is feasible to compute not only
the cost of all accommodations required, but also the social benefit of
keeping a known number of people with disabilities off welfare. 126
By contrast, in matters of children's special education, expenditure
justifications cannot rely on exact numbers. 127 Each time we offer a
child special education, we certainly buy hope and comfort for that
child's family and espouse a model of society that values inclusion and
diversity. But, we cannot know for sure how profitable this investment
will prove in terms of sheer economic efficiency. There is no precise
promise of welfare cost savings or of net societal gains. We do not know
how happily productive a child with a disability will become as a result
of early intervention or appropriate schooling. Funding special education
involves a leap of faith, and such leaps are especially vulnerable to politi-
cal pressure. When costs rise beyond politically acceptable levels, ad-
ministrators are bound to redefine both identification and service
standards to make means meet ends. In this context, zero-sum dynamics
are unavoidable. It is for this reason that controlling the fairness of the
game is a necessary, non-deferrable step.
IX. THE WAY AHEAD
The regressive distribution of educational resources within the pool
of children with disabilities is the result of three concurrent traits of the
IDEA design: private bargaining, the lack of transparent, accountable
standards, and the insufficient elasticity of service supply resulting from
budget constraints. For the reasons discussed in the preceding section,
budget constraints are unavoidable. The search for systemic improve-
ments must therefore focus on mechanisms of bargaining and accounta-
125 Id. at 231-233.
126 Who should bear such accommodation costs is a different question. See generally
Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 DuKE L.J.
79 (2003).
127 Many other differences can obviously be drawn between IDEA and ADA funding
is;ues. The analysis of accommodation mandates involves complexities that are unknown in
the field of special education. Private schools are under no duty to serve children with disabili-
ties; the problem of subsidizing with private money the social cost of disabilities-a problem
at the heart of these economic models-simply does not arise in the context of special educa-
tion. Subsidization of special education costs with taxpayers' money does indeed occur, but in
a much less direct and much more diffuse way than is contemplated in the ADA's design.
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bility. Let us now examine such mechanisms with the goal of sketching
plausible corrections or at least preventing further structural errors.
A. CONTRACT LESSONS
Because the negotiation process leading to the formulation of an
IEP is so crucial, proper distribution may arguably be achieved by im-
proving the equities of the bargaining process. This means making the
process uniformly accessible and reaching out to all families so as to
equip them with real "bargaining" tools. The IDEA itself contemplates
mechanisms for the participatory empowerment of all parents. 128 The
limitation of this strategy, already implemented in many ways, is that it
reproduces the Ackerman paradigm. 129 Information, subsidized access
to representation, and enhanced opportunities for involvement are still
likely to be quite effective for medium-income families, but less so for
those with little money and even less time.
Contract analogies may suggest other strategies as well, such as in-
creased judicial scrutiny of agency determination. The judicial review of
IEPs is currently characterized by a high degree of substantive deference
to administrative discretion.' 30 By contrast, the presence of bold con-
tractual elements in the IEP process might warrant a more stringent stan-
dard of review. 131 Like trial judges in contract disputes, reviewing courts
might be given access to hard distributive data and might be empowered
128 See Parent Training and Information Centers, 20 U.S.C. § 1471 (2003). This law
makes grants available to parent organizations to support parent training in bargaining, under-
standing special needs children, appreciating procedural safeguards, reading the IDEA, and
participating in school activities. The grants are designed to cater "particularly [to] under-
served parents and parents of children who may be inappropriately identified."
129 See supra, Section V.
130 See supra, Section VI.
131 The US Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley famously addressed this
issue. See supra note 37, at 198. The dialogue between Justice Rehnquist (for the majority)
and Justice White (dissenting) is a powerful rendition of the unresolved tension between ad-
ministrative discretion and contractual autonomy within the IEP logic. In Rowley, the U.S.
Supreme court was called for the first time to interpret the 1975 Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act and to clarify the concept of "appropriate education." Lower courts had
begun to read into the Act a broad imperative of non-discrimination, requiring that all children
receive the same opportunity to reach their maximum potential. By this potential-maximizing
logic, States and their educational agencies would be bound to strict substantive standards,
fully reviewable de novo in court. Id. at 217. In a passionate dissent, Justice White endorsed
entirely the lower courts' approach. Id. at 212-214. The Court's majority adopted instead a
minimal substantive standard of "appropriateness." In Rehnquist's words, "the intent of the
Act was more to open the door of public education to handicapped children on appropriate
terms than to guarantee any particular level of education once inside." Id. at 192. The post-
Rowley legislative developments, as interpreted by the courts, have imposed more stringent
constraints upon agency discretion, specifying that children with disabilities are entitled not
only to minimal accommodations in public schools, but also to real educational opportunities.
The Rowley decision, however, still sets the standard of deference. See Fort Zumwalt School
District v. Clynes, 119 F.3d 607 (8th Cit. 1997).
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to second-guess agencies on this basis. IEPs could be interpreted with
the same range of judicial discretion and gap-filling power enjoyed by
common-law courts in contract cases. This strategy, however, raises
questions of institutional competence. By law and in practice, agencies
are better suited than courts to the task of gathering statistical informa-
tion and comparing massive amounts of IEP findings. 32 Moreover, judi-
cial review happens quite late in the process, and depends upon litigant
initiative and relies on resources that may be, to reiterate, unavailable to
families of the "A" type. It is therefore preferable to inject distributive
considerations into the IEP process at a point in time prior to judicial
review, coinciding with the earliest possible stages of IEP formulation or,
at the very latest, with the intervention of hearing officers.
B. ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION AND DISTRIBUTION
As observed, the flexible standard of "appropriate education" fails
to constrain agency discretion and leads to unintended inequalities. IEP
processes are proper instances of what Matthew Diller has termed "the
new entrepreneurial model of benefit administration," characterized by
de-legalized discretion and providing no assurance of equal treatment. 133
The system is certainly in need of firmer guidelines. However, reverting
to the legal-bureaucratic model developed in the 1960s would be a radi-
cally anti-climatic move.134 Because the individualization of educational
plans has proven essential to the success of special education, adminis-
tration by hard rules is simply implausible at this stage.
The above discussion suggests that distributive analysis may inject
firmer guidelines in this process without unduly rigidifying the interac-
tion between recipients and agencies. Numbers may not provide an-
swers, but they certainly raise good questions and point at instances of
132 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics and the New Administra-
tive Law, 98 YALE L. J. 341, 347 (1988) (criticizing the fact that U.S. administrative law is
excessively focused on judicial review). "So long as courts remain at the center, the majority
of legal commentators can ignore issues related to economic efficiency and political choice."
Id. See also Therese Craparo, supra note 72, at 470 and passim (arguing for judicial restraint
in matters of special education).
133 See generally Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Dis-
cretion, and Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1126-28 (2000). "The
new [entrepreneurial model of benefit administration tends] to give much greater power to
ground-level employees. These employees are accorded broad discretion to make judgments in
individual cases. They are encouraged to influence recipients through persuasion and advice
and have broader powers to sanction recipients viewed as uncooperative. A system that was
principally legal in nature is becoming delegalized .... [I]n the absence of rules, the new
administrative regime provides no assurance of equal treatment. Indeed, the only existing
study of the issue found startling disparities between the treatment of African-American and
white recipients." (emphasis added)
134 The legal-bureaucratic model emphasized uniformity and predictability rather than in-
dividualization and relied on fixed rules rather than professional judgment. See id. at 1129.
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unintended redistribution within the pool of special education students.
Placing children with very severe needs in private residential facilities is
notoriously a much more expensive option than assigning them to sepa-
rate special education classrooms in public schools. For instance, in
Massachusetts during the school year 2002-2003, about 27% of all the
special needs students were of a race or ethnicity other than white. With
respect to this baseline, these children were largely over-represented in
separate classrooms, but significantly under-represented in private resi-
dential facilities. 135 The numbers are striking enough to deserve further
investigation. If the rate of severe disabilities among these children is
not significantly lower, what justifies the low incidence of costly residen-
tial placement? Many different factors, including cultural aversion to
empty nests, might explain these results. But, part of the answer might
be that certain families receive on average less support from public agen-
cies when pursuing the most costly educational options. This pattern is
most probably unrelated to discriminatory animus, but likely motivated
by different levels of investment in the IEP process and other measurable
data.136 An agency informed with such data is more likely to apply uni-
form standards to substantively similar cases and will be less prone to be
swayed in one direction or another depending by the peculiarities of any
particular family's style. Statistical evidence may also be enriched by
anecdotal narrative. Confidentiality prevents disclosure of names, but
not of anonymous facts. It is possible to conceive of Rawlsian (in addi-
tion to adversarial or self-interested) models of parental participation and
to use family involvement as a source of information on the relative out-
comes of different strategies. 37 Such changes would bring about in-
creased accountability and better opportunities for polyarchic
experimentation. In adjudicating individual cases, agencies and hearing
officers would be required to rely on rich databases and to compare the
quality and quantity of services devoted to specific types of disabilities.
A detailed elaboration of these corrective mechanisms exceeds the
scope of these pages, but it is an unavoidable and urgent step. Any re-
form of special education law that ignores the redistributive impact of
135 Only 16.5% of the students in private residential placement were of a race or ethnicity
other than white (a relative drop of almost 40% with respect to the baseline of 27%), but
almost 46% of the students in separate special education classes fall into this category (a 70%
increase). MASSACHUsErrs DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, SPECIAL EDUCATION PLANNING AND
POLICY DEVELOPMENT, Disability Data Focus Groups, Discussion Guide, Part 1, 7 (2003),
available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/sped/focus__groups/discussion__guide.pdf.
136 The American Institutes for Research recommend further "[multivariate analysis] to
disentangle the factors that might explain these patterns of variation in the levels of spending
on special education students .. " SPECIAL EDUCATION EXPENDITURE PROJECT, supra note 6,
at 11.
137 For an example of parents' advisory participation in the interest of all children with
disabilities, see, e.g., 603 CMR 28.07(4) (2005).
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participatory processes is bound to endorse and even reinforce existing
social disparities. The challenge is, once more, "to devise modes of gov-
ernance that summon public commitment and action in pursuit of ideals
of equality. . .without producing practices that fail or undermine pre-
cisely these ideals."' 38
138 Martha Minow, School Reform Outside Laboratory Conditions, 28 N.Y.U. Rav. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 333, 335 (2003).

